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W hat Anthony Chaney wants to provide us with thisbook could be considered a reply to the frequent call
made by authors such as Donna Haraway: “What must be cut
and what must be tied if multispecies flourishing on earth,
including human and other-than-human beings in kinship,
are to have a chance?” (Haraway 2016: 2). When Chaney
states that “we require stories” (17), the reader might find this
requirement in correlation with what Haraway suggests we
require: “learning to be truly present [...] as mortal critters
entwined in myriad unfinished configurations of places,
times, matters, meanings” (1). Does Gregory Bateson’s
works help us “staying with the trouble”?
Chaney reminds us that Gregory Bateson came from
a family that was firmly established in the intellectual
environment of his country. His grandfather, John Bateson,
was the headmaster at St. John´s College, Cambridge. The
research assistant of his father, William Bateson, was Nora
Barlow, the granddaughter of Charles Darwin and wife of
the queen’s physician (127). Since the beginning, when he
studied biology in Cambridge, Gregory Bateson dedicated
his works to building a theory of communication. Later on,
thanks to his fieldwork among Iatmul people of New Guinea
– where Bateson, Margaret Mead and her then husband Reo
Fortune “were analysing each other as much as or more than
they were the tribal people who surrounded them” (32) –,
he began to ask himself what protected a collective from
splintering or exploding. Where do diffusing patterns (such
as Iatmul naven ritual) come from? Already unsatisfied with
functional explanations, Bateson “could find no cause for
group equilibrium other than coincidence. [...] It was an
uneasy question to leave hanging: why should an entity not
explode?” (27-28).
Despite the recognition received for his anthropological
studies, Bateson did not decrease his attention towards ani-
mals. After observing with attention octopuses monkeys and
otters (111) with his new family – “doing natural history was
always a family affair” (103) –, he finally left for Hawaii to
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research on dolphins in an immense 300,000-gallon tank, and
“oceanarium” called Bateson’s Bay at the Oceanic Institute
in Hawaii. The problem of play-fighting is illustrative of
Bateson’s life-long concerns: how does an animal convey
to another one that its bite is only a play bite and not a
real bite? How do they communicate such a paradox, in
which a statement contradicts the meta-statement that frames
its meaning? (112). His hypothesis that mammals asked
(riddle of the Sphinx) questions to each other continually and
unconsciously, and that their answers contained information
(most important to them) about their relationships (111)
emphisezes those recent proposals (mostly inspired to the
theories of the biologist Jakob Johann von Uexküll and the
philosopher Charles Pierce) interested in nonhumans among
the so-called ontological turn (cf. Kohn 2013).
Also in a similar vein to some of the authors associated to
the ontological turn, Bateson arrived to certain deep concerns
about the future of the planet. At the congress on the Dialec-
tics of Liberation, which took place in London at the end of
the Sixties (247), he gave his audience — among which was
an impressed Allen Ginsberg —, according to Chaney, “a new
accounting of reality” that suggested greater responsibility
and emphasized dependence (3): “Bateson explained the
greenhouse effect and the potential consequences of a rise in
global temperature” (234). Building on his conceptualization
of the “double bind” — the inescapable paradox in which a
message was refuted by its context (“Don’t be so obedient!”)
(5) —, he viewed his world as a system in runaway, out of
balance and accelerating toward breakdown. Again, this
proposal could remind the contemporary reader that “There is
a fine line between acknowledging the extent and seriousness
of the troubles and succumbing to abstract futurism and
its affects of sublime despair and its politics of sublime
indifference” (6). To Chaney, Bateson’s participation at the
congress represented a shift in thinking about humankind and
the environment that is actually the underrecognized legacy
of the 1960s and the foremost intellectual experience of our
time (3).
Whichever the contribution of Bateson to this legacy
might be, it certainly was one emerging from a life troubled
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elder brother was killed by a bombshell a month before the
armistice of WWI, during WWII Gregory Bateson worked
with the Office of Strategic Services created by William
“Wild Bill” Donovan, also founder of the Central Intelligence
Agency (8), producing and deploying what was then called
“black propaganda”: information intended to subvert enemy
intelligence and morale (40). Not much is added in the book
about how Bateson saw this period of his work. Writing from
what is now Sri Lanka and was then the British colony of
Ceylon, he asks to a friend of his: “Do you like to be used
as an energy source? And do you like, at all, the product
achieved by combustion of little pieces of your image?” (41).
Chaney also recalls Bateson’s respect toward and relation
with Konrad Lorenz (156, 200), which corresponds to the
former’s late interest in dolphins’ forms of communication.
Building on and feeding the “mainstream fascination with
dolphins,” Life magazine once published a photo of Bateson
using a submerged giant ear in order to hear them and added
that one of his colleagues was working “at the behest of the
navy” implying that “dolphins might become sophisticated
new weapons in the Cold War” (105).
Beyond the vicissitudes of war, what might be more as-
tonishing is that such brilliant outcomes as those of Bateson’s
work were produced in an environment persistently haunted
by precarity. Such situation sometimes seems provoked by
himself and his desire to explore a different field of knowl-
edge. During his works with mental illness issues (between
his work as anthropologist and ethologist), Bateson turned
down two job offers from American psychiatric institutions
involving the continuation of his clinical work. His stay at the
Oceanic Institute in Hawaii illustrates well how his previous
affiliations usually represented a kind of temporary refuge for
him and his researches: “He was given the title of associate
director, along with a number of administrative duties, but
as usual, the position was funded largely by a grant Bateson
had himself obtained, and his research objectives were his
own. When that funding dried up, in just over a year, Bateson
was again at loose ends” (110). At the end of his career,
“the 1970s was a challenging time [...] in regard to both his
finances and his health [...] diagnosed with lung cancer [...]
his research life was over and thus his access to grants [...]
never having institutionalized himself, Bateson faced periods
of «singing for his supper»” (252).
Despite its very valuable sources (i.e., Bateson’s personal
letters) that illuminate the context of his intellectual work,
this book does not develop very much the legacy it points
out. What are the concrete contributions of this legacy to
the contemporary issues currently raised around a so-called
Anthropocene in which “life-enhacing entanglements disap-
pear from our landscapes” affecting “multispecies livability”
(Tsing et al. 2017: G4-G5)? Which could be the precise
components of Bateson’s contribution to the current debates
on the agency of non-humans that seek to avoid both natu-
ralist reductionisms and semiologist idealisms? And finally,
how does Bateson’s apparent distance from issues of power
and inequality should be considered if we aim to “provide
resonance to those other worlds that interrupt the one-world
story” producing “non-existence points at the non-existence
worlds” (Escobar 2016: 15-22)?
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